How China Could Use U.S. Farmland to Threaten or Undermine America

What’s Sparking the Concern

Over the past few years, policymakers in Washington have raised alarms about foreign ownership of U.S. farmland, especially by Chinese individuals or entities. They argue that even though Chinese agricultural land holdings are small, their proximity to sensitive sites and inadequate oversight create potential national security risks.

Recently, Agriculture Secretary Brooke Rollins proposed a ban on farmland sales to citizens of foreign adversaries, including China. She warned the public that such land could be used for surveillance or as staging grounds near military bases. Meanwhile, watchdog reports show U.S. agencies lack reliable data about how much farmland foreign investors own and exactly where that land lies.

While Chinese holdings amount to roughly 277,336 acres — very small compared to total U.S. farmland — some officials say the location of these holdings matters more than the acreage alone.

Possible Ways Farmland Could Be Misused

If someone wanted to exploit foreign farmland holdings in the U.S., experts suggest several scenarios that could pose real or theoretical threats:

1. Espionage and Surveillance
   Owning land near military bases, research labs, or critical infrastructure (like power grid facilities) can enable covert surveillance. Observers worry that farmland could be used to house sensors, communication equipment, or even drone launch points. Former national security officials point to cases where Chinese-owned parcels sit uncomfortably close to sensitive installations.
2. Supply Chain Manipulation
   Agriculture forms a core part of U.S. supply chains. If adversarial entities acquire land that produces crops or controls water resources, they could disrupt local supply or influence local policies. For example, restricting crop inputs or withholding harvest at critical times could damage local communities or wider food supply.
3. Food Security / Coercion
   Although U.S. exports agricultural products to China and many other countries, if foreign entities somewhere in the chain acquire enough influence or land near critical logistic routes, they could theoretically threaten food availability or use food as leverage in diplomatic or military coercion. While current holdings are small, some lawmakers argue future growth could shift risk.
4. Infrastructure Risk
   Farming operations require infrastructure: roads, storage, sometimes electric power. If malicious actors control land near sensitive infrastructure, they might be able to disrupt or sabotage access routes, or use them to support operations (like clandestine labs or drone launch pads) that compromise national security.
5. R&D Access and Intellectual Property Theft
   Some farmland is used for research trials (e.g., pesticide trials, crop modification). Ownership or control could enable access to proprietary agricultural research, seed genetics, or biotech processes. Over time, data collected from fields could be used to benefit foreign agricultural industries.

What the Evidence Shows

However, while these risks exist, much of the evidence suggests that China’s current holdings are minimal and often far from strategic assets. Key facts include:

• Chinese entities own less than 1% of the foreign-owned farmland in the U.S. Most foreign farmland owners come from countries like Canada, Netherlands, Italy, the UK, etc.
• Some U.S. states have laws restricting land purchases by non-citizens or foreign adversaries. These state-level restrictions vary widely.
• The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) has flagged that the USDA cannot reliably report which foreign entities own what acreage or precisely where because of gaps in reporting, unclear ownership structures, and poor tracking of leases vs. purchases.
• Chinese officials have countered that fears are overblown. Ambassador Xie Feng recently said that Chinese farmland ownership “poses no threat,” citing the low percentages and arguing that restrictions represent politicization of trade.

Emerging U.S. Policy Responses

Because of these concerns, U.S. lawmakers and agencies have started to act. Key responses include:

• Proposed FARMLAND Act: This bipartisan bill would allow the Committee on Foreign Investment in the U.S. (CFIUS) to review foreign purchases or leases of farmland exceeding certain sizes (e.g. 320 acres or $5 million). It would also require reporting, strengthen oversight, and ban foreign entities from certain agricultural subsidies if they are deemed adversarial.
• USDA Actions: Secretary Rollins has announced plans to ban or severely restrict farmland purchases by “foreign adversary-linked buyers.” These include enhanced disclosure rules, potential clawbacks, and tighter state-level and federal cooperation.
• State Laws: Several states are moving independently to block purchases near military bases or sensitive installations. For example, Missouri prohibits purchases from certain countries near military sites. Other states demand full disclosure or impose prohibitions where national security risks are judged high.
• Strengthened Oversight: Congress has tasked federal agencies with improving data collection, closing loopholes in the Agricultural Foreign Investment Disclosure Act (AFIDA), and increasing penalties for noncompliance.

Limitations and Counterarguments

Even among critics of these risks, several counterpoints appear regularly:

• The percentage of land owned by Chinese entities is very low, typically under 1% of foreign-owned farmland, and far less of the total U.S. farmland. Thus, many argue that the risk is more theoretical than real.
• Many acquisitions are for non-strategic uses: forested land, pasture, leasehold, or renewable energy installations rather than operations near military bases.
• Laws already require disclosure of foreign ownership under AFIDA. Critics say what the U.S. lacks is proper enforcement rather than new law.
• Some Chinese landholders assert that they act independently of government influence. However, U.S. law and analysts note that companies in China often face legal pressure to cooperate with state intelligence agencies. That, they argue, increases the risk even from private actors.

Why This Matters Now

Several factors make this debate urgent:

• Increasing geopolitical tension between the U.S. and China, especially over trade, technology, and military competition.
• Concern over food security post-pandemic, supply chain resilience, and climate challenges pushing U.S. policy to think carefully about who controls land and resources.
• Public scrutiny over foreign influence and transparency in land ownership, especially in rural and military border zones.
• Legislative momentum: both Houses of Congress seem ready to pass reforms restricting foreign farmland ownership and improving national security oversight.

What to Watch

To assess whether these fears could become actionable threats, the following signals are especially important:

1. Properties near military or sensitive infrastructure
   Any land purchases near bases, missile silos, intelligence centers, or other critical sites deserve close scrutiny.
2. Leases vs. Ownership
   Buying land outright offers different risks than leasing for many years. Long-term leases can provide similar control and access.
3. Transparency improvements
   Will USDA or Congress pass more precise mapping or public databases of foreign farmland ownership, including ownership structure and connections to foreign governments?
4. New laws or executive orders
   Pay attention to bills like the FARMLAND Act, or executive orders that might “claw back” property, limit purchases by citizens from foreign adversaries, or ban certain foreign land use.
5. Enforcement actions
   How many existing properties will be reviewed, and whether any are forced to change ownership or usage because of security concerns.
6. Public and media scrutiny
   Local community reaction, watchdog reports, and investigative journalism will put pressure on whether fears are grounded or inflated.

Bottom Line

In short, while current Chinese ownership of U.S. farmland remains small and largely not concentrated in sensitive locations, the combination of proximity to key infrastructure and weak oversight raises plausible risks. The policy debate is growing because even a few bad cases could set precedents or expose vulnerabilities.

As U.S. lawmakers push forward, the choice is between precaution and potential exposure. If policies improve transparency, tighten restrictions where necessary, and ensure fair but secure oversight, then the fears may be managed. If instead the situation remains opaque, the threat models — espionage, supply chain coercion, or interference — could become more realistic.